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FOREWORD
Many say one of NATO’s greatest strengths is its
ability to conduct multinational military planning
through its integrated military command. If this
statement is true, the quadrennial NATO Defence
Planning Process (NDPP) is one of the alliance’s crown
jewels. Through this process, the alliance strives to
ensure it has the capabilities and capacity necessary
to handle numerous threats and challenges across the
alliance’s three mission areas: collective defense, crisis
response, and cooperative security. For several allies,
the NDPP is their only defense planning process. For
the alliance, the NDPP represents a major element in
the organization’s efforts to distribute fairly the burden
of the member states’ common security requirements.
This monograph is more than a descriptive account
of the NDPP, although the monograph provides an
in-depth, insider-informed treatment of the rather
esoteric bureaucratic procedure. Dr. John Deni
addresses a most unusual—and yet most welcome—
outcome of the 2014–18 iteration of the NDPP. In 2017,
for the first time since the end of the Cold War, none
of the capability targets identified in the NDPP were
left on the negotiating table. Previously, capability
targets were identified by the alliance’s secretariat,
but they remained unfilled as allies failed to assume
responsibility for them. In 2017, though, a new
precedent was set—one that represented a significant
victory for advocates of more equitable transatlantic
burden sharing.
Unpacking the reason all capability targets were
apportioned for the first time in over a quarter century
can help both US and European policy makers address
continued challenges in burden sharing. By replicating
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what worked in the 2014–18 iteration of the NDPP
as well as continuing to improve on the successes
achieved to date, the United States has a better chance
of ensuring it has capable allies by its side with the
necessary capacity to address emerging security
challenges. Dr. Deni offers several recommendations
that should help policy makers maintain and
strengthen the NDPP in the years ahead. For this
reason, the US Army War College Strategic Studies
Institute is pleased to offer this study as a contribution
to the national security debate over burden sharing
and multilateral collaboration.

CAROL V. EVANS
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
US Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
How can NATO and its most important member,
the United States, better ensure more equitable
transatlantic burden sharing? One of the key tools
the alliance uses to distribute capability and capacity
burdens fairly is the NATO Defence Planning Process
(NDPP). The NDPP consists of five distinct steps that
unfold over a period of four years. The purpose of the
NDPP is to harmonize defense planning among the
allies by identifying the types and quantity of forces
necessary to undertake the alliance’s full spectrum of
missions: collective defense, crisis management, and
cooperative security.
In this monograph, Dr. John Deni examines the
case of the 2014–18 NDPP. During this iteration of
the quadrennial NDPP, for the first time in a quarter
century, the allies agreed to accept all of the capability
targets the alliance’s international secretariat identified
as necessary to fulfill NATO’s missions. After more
than 25 years of a steadily widening gap in transatlantic
burden sharing, the allies apparently reversed course
and took a major step toward greater equity.
Why was the NDPP so effective in 2017? The
most obvious answer might be the changed threat
environment, resulting from Russia’s 2014 invasion
of Ukraine and the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria. Another explanation might be the role
US President Donald Trump played in browbeating
European allies when the subject of NATO was raised.
But did other circumstances or events contribute to
the effectiveness of the NDPP? This study relies on an
array of primary and secondary sources—including
over two dozen interviews with personnel directly
involved in the 2014–18 NDPP—to unpack the events

vii

US Army War College

and decisions that ultimately resulted in a significant
improvement in transatlantic burden sharing. The
research findings reveal answers that are sometimes
intuitive and at other times surprising.
Understanding why and how the allies changed
course on burden sharing through the 2014–18 NDPP
is important for a variety of reasons. Most importantly,
this case provides valuable lessons US officials and
NATO leaders can apply as they work their way
through future iterations of the NDPP, especially
given the fiscal challenges flowing from coronavirus
disease 2019. To leverage the lessons of the 2014–18
NDPP, this study concludes with recommendations
for replicating what worked, avoiding what did
not, and continuing to refine the process to ensure
transatlantic burden sharing continues to trend toward
greater equity.
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SECURITY THREATS, AMERICAN PRESSURE,
AND THE ROLE OF KEY PERSONNEL:
HOW NATO’S DEFENCE PLANNING PROCESS
IS ALLEVIATING THE
BURDEN-SHARING DILEMMA
INTRODUCTION
For modern military enterprises, defense
planning—the political and military process used
by countries to provide the capabilities needed
to meet the countries’ defense commitments—is
critical, and defense planning is equally critical for
modern intergovernmental security organizations
like NATO. Every four years, NATO implements
the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). This
process provides a framework within which national
and alliance defense planning activities can be
harmonized to meet agreed-upon defense capability
targets in the most effective way. The goal is to ensure
the timely identification, development, and delivery
of the necessary range of interoperable forces to
undertake the alliance’s full spectrum of missions,
including collective defense, crisis management, and
cooperative security. Most notably, the NDPP includes
the allocation of specific military requirements to
individual allies or groups of allies. Usually, this
allocation is the most contentious part of the NDPP.
For many allies, the NDPP is their primary defense
planning tool, and, as such, it is deeply entwined with
issues regarding NATO’s purpose, the commitment of
all allies to strengthening their own defenses, and the
viability of NATO’s mutual defense clause.1
1. Alexander Mattelaer, “Preparing NATO for the Next DefencePlanning Cycle,” RUSI Journal 159, no. 3 (June/July 2014): 30–35.
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In 2017, for the first time since the end of the Cold
War, none of the defense capability requirements
identified and allocated to allies through the NDPP
were left on the negotiating table; in NATO parlance,
all of the capability targets were apportioned
among the allies. All of the capability targets being
apportioned was a remarkable achievement in terms
of burden sharing—an achievement NATO hopes to
replicate in the future. In previous iterations of the
NDPP, requirements for specific military capabilities
would be considered and debated, but they were not
always apportioned to specific allies or groups of
allies, leaving the alliance open to considerable risk.
Why was the NDPP so effective in 2017? Was
the process effective because of the changed threat
environment, resulting from Russia’s 2014 invasion of
Ukraine and the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria? Was the process effective because of newly
inaugurated President Donald Trump’s relentless
emphasis on fairer transatlantic burden sharing and
the 2-percent defense spending goal? Did the alliance
simply drop its standards and lower the requirements,
thereby making meeting the requirements easier
for allies? Or were other variables, such as public
opinion or shared norms of behavior, at play? What
factor or factors explain why the allies changed their
burden-sharing behavior in 2017, and how might this
successful outcome be replicated in future iterations
of the NDPP?
Understanding why and how NATO achieved
this goal in 2017 is important for both practical and
theoretical reasons. Regarding the former, the 2014–18
iteration of the NDPP provides valuable lessons US
officials and NATO leaders can apply as they work
their way through the 2018–22 NDPP and future
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iterations, particularly in the wake of economic
dislocation induced by coronavirus disease 2019.
Replicating what worked, avoiding what did not, and
continuing to refine the process can help to promote
fairer burden sharing as well as the fulfillment of
critical requirements necessary for the defense of all
NATO members.
Understanding how sovereign members of an
intergovernmental organization share burdens
remains an important academic pursuit in political
science theory.2 Unpacking the case of the 2014–18
NDPP will help to shed light on organizational
behavior, bureaucratic processes, the role of “policy
entrepreneurs” in organizations, and alliance
management. Studying the 2014–18 NDPP will
also fill gaps in the growing body of literature on
NATO behavior.
This study employs a qualitative methodology
known as process tracing, which is a useful tool for
within-case analysis.3 Process tracing focuses on the
unfolding of events or situations over time and in
detail. By developing an in-depth understanding of
2. For example, see Jo Jakobsen and Tor G. Jakobsen,
“Tripwires and Free-Riders: Do Forward-Deployed US Troops
Reduce the Willingness of Host-Country Citizens to Fight for
Their Country?,” Contemporary Security Policy 40, no. 2 (2019):
135–64; Tim Haesebrouck, “Democratic Participation in the
Air Strikes against Islamic State: A Qualitative Comparative
Analysis,” Foreign Policy Analysis 14, no. 2 (2018): 254–75;
Tomáš Weiss, “Between NATO and a Hard Place: Defence
Spending Debate in Germany and Czechia,” European Security
28, no. 2 (2019): 193–211; and Marina E. Henke, “Buying Allies:
Payment Practices in Multilateral Military Coalition-Building,”
International Security 43, no. 4 (2019): 128–62.
3. David Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” Political
Science and Politics 44, no. 4 (2011): 823–30.
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the key steps in an event or situation—in this case,
the NDPP—a researcher is able to characterize and
analyze change, which in turn allows one to draw
causal inferences from the available diagnostic
evidence—in this case, interviews and other direct
communications with 25 individuals closely involved
in the NDPP as well as public opinion data, threat
assessments, official government pronouncements
and rhetoric, and economic and fiscal data. Next,
I further operationalize the decisions to apportion
all NDPP capability targets by examining defense
spending patterns during the mid-2010s. Although not
conflating defense spending with burden sharing is
important, the former necessarily underpins decisions
made by NATO allies on whether to accept capability
targets apportioned through the NDPP and share
burdens fairly.
Before examining how the NDPP played out in
2017, one must examine the NDPP’s constituent steps.
Following this examination, the monograph analyzes
the available scholarly literature to determine the
reasons allies might have behaved differently in the
2014–18 iteration of the NDPP. This analysis leads to
several hypotheses, which are then tested against the
story of the 2014–18 NDPP. Then, the monograph
attempts to summarize key lessons learned and offer
policy makers recommendations on how to replicate
the success of 2017.
Based on the available evidence, the most
important variables in explaining the events of 2017
were the changed threat environment, political
pressure from Washington, and the role of policy
entrepreneurs working within NATO. Together,
these three explanatory variables best explain
the novel outcome of the 2014–18 NDPP. Not
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coincidentally, these variables also point toward some
of the recommendations policy makers might consider
leveraging to promote more equitable burden sharing
in the future.
This monograph will demonstrate many NATO
entities, such as the NATO International Staff and
Allied Command Transformation (ACT), are involved
in the NDPP. These entities are bureaucratic actors
distinct from the military or civilian officials of
allied governments. In most instances, identifying
or referring to the NATO entities specifically makes
sense; however, in some cases, the monograph will
refer to the entities collectively as the alliance’s
“international secretariat.”
THE NATO DEFENCE PLANNING PROCESS
The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP)
consists of five distinct steps that unfold over a
period of four years. The purpose of the process is
to harmonize defense planning among the allies by
identifying the types and quantity of forces necessary
for undertaking the alliance’s full spectrum of missions
in terms of collective defense, crisis management, and
cooperative security. Getting the mix of capabilities
and capacity right and then spreading the mix out
fairly is no quick or easy feat because the alliance is
now comprised of 30 countries, each with a wide
variety of political, fiscal, international, and other
factors shaping defense planning and budgeting. In
the words of one observer, harmonization through the
NDPP is designed “to bring order to chaos.”4
4. Officials from the US Mission to NATO, interview by the
author, October 24, 2017.
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The first step in the NDPP is the development of
the Political Guidance for Defence Planning. This
guidance, in the form of a document approved by
all NATO allies at the defense minister level, sets out
the objectives for the alliance to achieve. The Political
Guidance is more specific than the broader strategic
documents from which it is drawn, such as the
alliance’s strategy document, the Strategic Concept.
The Political Guidance applies agreed-upon alliance
policies to the defense planning context. The Political
Guidance reflects the threats, risks, and challenges
the alliance expects to face and identifies the number,
scale, and nature of operations the alliance should be
able to conduct. This latter concept is typically referred
to as the alliance’s Level of Ambition.
The second step in the NDPP is the determination
of military requirements. Allied Command
Transformation (ACT) leads the process by using the
Level of Ambition and other information in the Political
Guidance to develop an initial list of requirements,
which may be quantitative or qualitative in nature.
Allied Command Operations (ACO) provides input
as well, particularly by verifying the initial ACT list
will be sufficient for current operational plans and no
requirement gaps will remain. The final, consolidated
list of required capabilities identified through
this process is known as the Minimum Capability
Requirements (MCR).
The third step of the NDPP is the apportionment
of requirements through the setting of capability
targets for individual allies. Major players in this step
include ACT, which has the lead initially; ACO; and
defense planners from the NATO International Staff
and NATO International Military Staff. Together,
these entities apply two principles to ensure equity
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as they apportion capability requirements to
specific allies: fair burden sharing and reasonable
challenge. Through the use of these principles and in
consideration of other factors, such as relative national
wealth, the alliance tries to avoid saddling allies with
an unfair burden relative to other allies or demanding
more than an ally is reasonably capable of delivering
based on its defense budget and force structure. The
result is a target package for each ally that identifies
existing and future capabilities requested by NATO
and includes associated priorities and time lines. The
targets are expressed in terms that provide sufficient
flexibility for innovative solutions to fulfill capability
target requirements.
Allied Command Transformation (ACT), with
support from ACO, explains the apportionment in
meetings at NATO Headquarters and at apportionment
workshops all allies are expected to attend. Thereafter,
personnel from ACT, ACO, the NATO International
Staff, and the alliance’s International Military Staff
conduct consultation meetings in allied capitals. Based
on these consultations, the International Staff takes the
lead to refine or otherwise clarify the capability targets
(and related justifications) for each ally.
After the capability target packages have been
revised, the International Staff leads a series of
Multilateral Examinations. During these examinations,
the allies review and agree on each target package on
the basis of “consensus minus one”—the ally whose
target package is the subject of examination cannot
veto an otherwise unanimous decision by the rest of
the allies. But if an ally objects to its target package, the
ally only needs to convince one other ally to break the
consensus. For this reason, allies have been known to
engage in quid pro quo. Collusion on technologically
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advanced military hardware is more common because
it tends to be expensive.5
If, after the Multilateral Examinations, some
targets are “unapportioned,” the commanders of ACO
and ACT conduct an operational impact assessment.
Typically, most targets—but not all—are apportioned.
After all Multilateral Examinations have been
completed, the final, agreed-upon capability target
packages are forwarded to the North Atlantic
Council for submission to allied defense ministers.
Defense ministers then adopt the packages and
agree to integrate them into their national defense
planning processes.
The fourth step in the NDPP is to facilitate
implementation. The NATO international secretariat
primarily occupies a supporting role during this step,
helping to assist allies as they fulfill their national
target package commitments, either individually or
through multinational projects. Given the nature of
defense acquisition, this step unfolds continuously.
The fifth and final step of the NDPP is to review
the results. This step is conducted every two years,
providing opportunities for course correction. The
International Staff leads this examination of whether
and how allies are meeting their allocated capability
targets. Data for this assessment is provided by all
allies in the form of their national defense plans and
policies, military forces and capabilities, nonmilitary
forces that could potentially contribute to alliance
operations, and the spending details of their national
defense budgets. After the examinations have been
completed, overview summaries of each finalized
5. Member of the NATO International Staff, interview by
the author, October 12, 2016.
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assessment are then compiled into a Capability
Report that is reviewed and agreed upon by the North
Atlantic Council, which then provides the report to
alliance defense ministers.
WHAT DRIVES BURDEN-SHARING DECISIONS?
Capability shortfalls have long been a recurring
issue within NATO, particularly during the Vietnam
War era, when US operational demands outside of
Europe compelled American leaders to remove a
division’s worth of troops as well as several combat
aircraft squadrons from Europe.6 But during most
of the Cold War, allies accepted their capability
apportionments relatively easily, primarily because
of the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the
Warsaw Pact.7 In the early 1990s, the demise of the
Soviet Union led to dramatic unilateral cuts in defense
budgets and reductions in force structure across
the entire alliance. Especially as the alliance became
involved in expeditionary operations in places such
as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, cuts in defense
budgets and force structure made accepting capability
apportionments and fulfilling capability targets more
difficult for allies. As a result, NATO defense planning
routinely resulted in unallocated capabilities—until
2017. In that year, as the NDPP unfolded, not a single

6. Diego Ruiz Palmer, A Strategic Odyssey: Constancy of
Purpose and Strategy-Making in NATO, 1949–2019 (Rome: NATO
Defense College, 2019), 53.
7. Member of the International Staff, interview by the
author, October 24, 2017; and civilian official assigned to the
Dutch delegation to NATO, interview by the author, October
24, 2017.
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capability target was left unallocated for the first time
since the end of the Cold War. What changed?
The Importance of Increased Defense Spending
The apportionment of all capability targets was
very likely made possible by the availability of
additional defense budget resources. In other words,
allies increased government spending and allocated
the increase to defense, reallocated budget resources
away from nondefense and toward defense accounts,
or both. Indeed, nearly all European members of
NATO increased their defense budgets after 2014 and
2015. Figure 1 depicts defense spending by European
NATO members from 2012 through 2019 in constant
2015 millions of US dollars. In nearly all cases,
spending rose after 2014 and 2015.
Given the wide disparity in the magnitude of
defense spending among just the European allies,
figure 2 displays the same data using a logarithmic
scale. Although some of the changes from year to year
are slight, the trend across nearly the entire alliance
has been upward since 2014.
European allies were possibly siphoning funds
from other nondefense budgetary accounts instead of
expanding overall government spending. Regardless,
the outcome was the same: Available defense
resources increased, enabling (but not compelling)
alliance members to agree to the apportionment of all
NDPP capability targets.
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Could NATO allies have shifted money from
military accounts or activities not recommended
through the NDPP to capabilities and capacities that
were part of the allies’ respective capability target
packages? In other words, perhaps allies were simply
shifting funds within their respective defense budgets.
For example, allies could have been moving funds out
of current operations and into military procurement
accounts as NATO operations in Afghanistan were
waning. The available evidence indicates this shifting
probably did not occur. By disaggregating defense
expenditures, one can see nearly all categories of
military spending were trending upward for European
NATO members after 2014, as seen in figures 3, 4, 5,
and 6 (the available data for 2019 is insufficient). (Note
that NATO includes in the Other Defense Expenditures
category operations and maintenance expenditures,
other research and development expenditures, and
any expenditures not allocated among the Equipment,
Personnel, and Infrastructure categories.) This upward
trend means instead of shifting money among defense
accounts—from the accounts that did not help the ally
in question fulfill its capability targets to the accounts
that did—European NATO allies relied on increased
defense spending across the board.
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Increased defense funding therefore appears to
have been a necessary factor for members to agree to
the apportionment of all NDPP capability targets. To
be clear, though, increased defense funding did not
necessarily mean NATO allies were compelled to use
the additional resources for the apportionment of all
NDPP-assigned capability targets. For example, allies
could have decided to devote their additional defense
funds to military capabilities and capacities that were
not included in their capability target packages but
were considered to be more useful for other national
defense priorities outside of NATO.8 For this reason,
separating defense spending from burden sharing as
distinct political choices is important. But NATO as
well as many scholars tend to view burden sharing
through the prism of defense spending, especially
in terms of the alliance-wide goal of spending the
equivalent of 2 percent of the countries’ gross domestic
product on defense. Nonetheless, for the purposes
of this monograph, although defense spending and
burden sharing are clearly related—the former is
a necessary element of the latter—they are not to be
conflated. If one were to assume defense spending
was the only measure of burden sharing, then one
could conclude Greece, which routinely spends more
than the equivalent of 2 percent of its gross domestic
product on defense, is carrying a fair share of the
defense burden. But this statement is highly debatable
because Greece spends most of its defense budget
(70 percent) on personnel and has a poor record of
contributing to major NATO operations. For example,
Greece typically contributed fewer troops to NATO’s
International Security Assistance Force mission in
8. Alexander Mattelaer, “Revisiting the Principles of NATO
Burden-Sharing,” Parameters 46, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 25–33.
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Afghanistan than many smaller allies like Latvia did;
Greece even contributed less than some non-NATO
partners, like New Zealand.9
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constant millions (US$)

9. NATO, “ISAF Placemats Archive,” updated May 23,
2017, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/107995.htm.
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Scholarly Literature on Burden Sharing
A vast amount of scholarly literature addresses
the determinants of burden sharing; thus, mining
this body of work for independent variables to help
explain the 2014–18 NDPP is reasonable. International
relations, political economy, comparative politics,
and foreign policy decision making provide answers
to questions surrounding burden sharing, defense
policy, and resource allocation. Dividing the available
literature into two broad categories—domestic or
state-level determinants and international or systemlevel determinants—is helpful.
Among the scholars who favor state-level
determinants, some argue regime type is the most
important variable for explaining whether and how
states decide to shoulder more of the common defense
burden.10 Specifically, governments that are led by
a single key decision maker—such as a president
or a prime minister in a single-party parliamentary
system (that is, a parliamentary system in which a
single party controls the government)—may be more
willing to shoulder more of the defense burden,
in an operational sense at least, than governments
comprised of parliamentary coalitions.
Other scholars point to public opinion as having
a substantial impact on the willingness of political
leaders to share defense burdens and increase defense

10. David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, NATO
in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2014).
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spending.11 The public-opinion theory can be a twoway street, with political leaders attempting to shape
public opinion through strong narratives that justify
burden sharing.12 Nonetheless, the point remains
political leaders have greater freedom of action to
assume greater defense burdens if the leaders also
have public opinion on their side. Other scholars rely
on role theory, the pursuit of prestige, or strategic
culture—that is, popular conceptions of the actions
a country should take, what the country’s place is,
or how the country should engage—as important
determinants in whether and how a country decides to

11. Rachel A. Dicke et al., “NATO Burden-Sharing in
Libya: Understanding the Contributions of Norway, Spain
and Poland to the War Effort,” Polish Quarterly of International
Affairs 22, no. 4 (2013): 29–53; Jo Jakobsen, “Is European NATO
Really Free-Riding? Patterns of Material and Non-Material
Burden-Sharing After the Cold War,” European Security 27, no.
4 (2018): 490–514; Justin Massie, “Why Democratic Allies Defect
Prematurely: Canadian and Dutch Unilateral Pullouts from the
War in Afghanistan,” Democracy and Security 12, no. 2 (2016):
85–113; Richard C. Eichenberg and Richard Stoll, “Representing
Defense: Democratic Control of the Defense Budget in the United
States and Western Europe,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, no. 4
(August 2003): 399–422; and Thomas Hartley and Bruce Russett,
“Public Opinion and the Common Defense: Who Governs
Military Spending in the United States?,” American Political
Science Review 86, no. 4 (December 1992): 905–15.
12. Jens Ringsmose and Berit Kaja Børgesen, “Shaping
Public Attitudes towards the Deployment of Military Power:
NATO, Afghanistan and the Use of Strategic Narratives,”
European Security 20, no. 4 (2011): 505–28.
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share the defense burden.13 Some research has shown
a country’s decisions may differ depending on its size,
with smaller allies more concerned with perceptions
across the alliance.14
Finally, some scholars rely on political-economic
explanations for burden sharing. Decisions to increase
defense spending—an apparently necessary but
not always sufficient element of increased burden
sharing—are often related to domestic economic
performance. Advocates of this perspective therefore
argue burden sharing decreases in economically
difficult times and periods of fiscal belt-tightening.15
In contrast to state-level determinants, many
scholars have argued in favor of system-level
variables when trying to explain burden-sharing
behavior. The geopolitical environment, especially
international security crises and threats, arguably
forms the most important systemic variable.
Proponents of this perspective argue when a state
perceives a security threat or is engaged in a crisis,
the state is more willing to increase its defense
13. Stephen J. Cimbala and Peter Forster, The US, NATO and
Military Burden-Sharing (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2005),
18; Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms
and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1996); and Jordan Becker, “The Correlates of Transatlantic
Burden Sharing: Revising the Agenda for Theoretical and Policy
Analysis,” Defense & Security Analysis 33, no. 2 (2017): 131–57.
14.

Weiss, “Between NATO and a Hard Place,” 193–211.

15. Ellen Hallams and Benjamin Schreer, “Towards a
‘Post-American’ Alliance? NATO Burden-Sharing After Libya,”
International Affairs 88, no. 2 (March 2012): 313–27; and Andrew
Richter, “Sharing the Burden? US Allies, Defense Spending, and
the Future of NATO,” Comparative Strategy 35, no. 4 (August
2016): 298–314.
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spending and to take on a greater share of common
defense burdens.16
Other scholars have found when a state is part of
an alliance, the state’s share of the common defense
burden is essentially inversely proportional to the
amount of defense provided by the state’s allies,
especially for larger members of an alliance.17 Thus,
if a member of an alliance is taking on more of the
shared defense burden, the member may be doing so
because its allies are shirking their responsibilities.
A related phenomenon arguably more common in
seemingly permanent alliances like NATO is burden
shifting. Because members of an alliance such as
NATO presumably have an interest in the alliance’s
continued existence, they avoid engaging completely
in free riding, which might lead to abandonment by
16. Andrew Bennett et al., “Burden-Sharing in the Persian
Gulf War,” International Organization 48, no. 1 (Winter 1994):
39–75; William Nordhaus, John R. Oneal, and Bruce Russett, “The
Effects of the International Security Environment on National
Military Expenditures: A Multicountry Study,” International
Organization 66, issue 3 (Summer 2012): 491–513; and Gary Zuk
and Nancy R. Woodbury, “US Defense Spending, Electoral
Cycles, and Soviet-American Relations,” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 30, no. 3 (September 1986): 445–68.
17. Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler, “NATO BurdenSharing: Past and Future,” Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 6
(November 1999): 665–80; Joseph Lepgold, “NATO’s Post–Cold
War Collective Action Problem,” International Security 23, no. 1
(Summer 1998): 78–106; John R. Oneal and Paul F. Diehl, “The
Theory of Collective Action and NATO Defense Burdens: New
Empirical Tests,” Political Research Quarterly 47, no. 2 (June 1994):
373–96; Glenn Palmer, “Corralling the Free Rider: Deterrence
and the Western Alliance,” International Studies Quarterly 34,
no. 2 (June 1990): 147–64; and Mancur Olson Jr. and Richard
Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” Review of
Economics and Statistics 48, no. 3 (August 1966): 268.
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the members that are carrying the burden or to the
collapse of the organization. Instead, each ally tries to
shift some amount of its defense burden to its allies
without completely wrecking the alliance.18
Another potential system-level independent
variable is the role played by international norms of
behavior.19 Through iterative coordination over time,
some scholars argue, alliance members form stronger
cooperative habits with each other, particularly those
related to deterrence and international security.20
In other words, some alliance members may have
chosen to maintain solidarity with each other versus
choosing to once again cut defense spending, shirk
responsibilities, and leave some capability targets
unapportioned, even while others were increasing
spending and providing more security goods.
Instead of freely choosing to maintain solidarity,
perhaps the allies perceived coercive pressure from
the United States—the dominant member of the
alliance—to accept all capability targets. The fear of
abandonment by the alliance’s most important member
could conceivably motivate European members to
take on a greater share of the common defense burden
as a means of safeguarding the American commitment
18. Wallace Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and BurdenShifting in NATO (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003).
19. Frédéric Mérand and Antoine Rayroux, “The Practice
of Burden Sharing in European Crisis Management Operations,”
European Security 25, no. 4 (October 2016): 442–60.
20. Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Robert Axelrod, “An
Evolutionary Approach to Norms,” American Political Science
Review 80, no. 4 (December 1986): 1095–112; and Glenn Palmer,
“Alliance Politics and Issue Areas: Determinants of Defense
Spending,” American Journal of Political Science 34, no. 1 (February
1990): 190–211.
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to their security.21 Washington’s attempted use of
coercion vis-à-vis its allies is nothing new in burden
sharing or defense spending. But coercion has had a
limited record of success in this regard, at least among
the larger members of the alliance, like Germany,
the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Turkey, Spain,
and Poland.22
Borrowing from principal-agent theory, perhaps
the alliance organization wields some degree of
influence over allies’ national defense spending and
subsequent national decisions on the apportionment
and acceptance of capability targets. Since the end
of the Cold War, the alliance, especially NATO’s
international secretariat, has grown in authority
and influence in some issue areas through the
process of internationalization, particularly vis-àvis smaller allies that lack Pentagon-sized defense
establishments.23 This growth in authority and
influence should not imply NATO has become a
supranational body; rather, the levers of control
available to NATO’s many principals mean the agent
is unlikely to ever spin completely out of allies’ control.
But this growth in authority and influence means the
international secretariat wields influence in processes
21. Jens Ringsmose, “Paying for Protection: Denmark’s
Military Expenditure during the Cold War,” Cooperation and
Conflict 44, no. 1 (March 2009): 73–97; and Glenn H. Snyder, “The
Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36, no. 4
(July 1984): 461–95.
22. John R. Deni, NATO and Article 5 (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2017); and Charles A. Kupchan, “NATO
and the Persian Gulf: Examining Intra-Alliance Behavior,”
International Organization 42, no. 2 (Spring 1988): 317–46.
23. Sebastian Mayer, ed., NATO’s Post-Cold War Politics:
The Changing Provision of Security (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2014).
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such as the NDPP and decisions on whether to agree
to the apportionment of all capability targets.
Finally, some scholars argue both domestic-level
and international-level factors explain defensespending and burden-sharing outcomes. Scholars who
advocate this integrative or blended approach have
generally found international threats drive increases
in defense spending or decisions to take on greater
burden sharing, and domestic political and economic
factors drive the purchases countries make with their
additional resources or the specific form of burden
sharing the countries undertake.24
The Hypotheses
To summarize the discussion above, the existing
scholarly literature on burden sharing helps to
generate a list of reasonable hypotheses that might
conceivably explain the NDPP events of 2017.
• Hypothesis 1 (regime type): Alliance members
led by presidents or prime ministers in singleparty parliamentary systems were most willing
to agree to the apportionment of all NDPP
capability targets.
• Hypothesis 2 (public opinion): Public opinion in
most allied countries favored increased defense
spending, which enabled political leaders
to agree to the apportionment of all NDPP
capability targets.
• Hypothesis 3 (domestic political economy):
Alliance members leveraged the apportionment
of all capability targets as a means of addressing
24. Bennett et al., “Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf
War,” 39–75; and Kupchan, “NATO and the Persian Gulf,”
317–46.
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•

•

•

•

•

widespread unemployment and poor economic
prospects domestically.
Hypothesis 4 (external security threat): The
increased sense of threat posed by Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine and the rise of the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria—coupled with limited
European military capacity to respond—
compelled all allies to agree to the apportionment
of their capability targets.
Hypothesis 5 (collective action dilemma): Each
member of NATO feared its allies would shirk
their respective responsibilities, and, therefore,
alliance members decided independently to
agree to the apportionment of their individual
capability targets.
Hypothesis 6 (shared norms): Alliance
members perceived a sense of solidarity
within the transatlantic community, which
led to a consensus on the need to agree to the
apportionment of all capability targets.
Hypothesis 7 (American coercion): European
members of the alliance, fearful of American
abandonment amid rising security challenges,
yielded to coercive pressure from Washington
to agree to the apportionment of all
capability targets.
Hypothesis 8 (international secretariat’s
influence):
The
alliance’s
international
secretariat successfully wielded the NDPP to
either convince or cajole allies to agree to the
apportionment of all capability targets.

The next section examines in detail the 2014–18
iteration of the NDPP, paying particular attention to
the events of 2017.
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THE 2014–18 NDPP
In June 2015, NATO defense ministers met in
Brussels and approved the Political Guidance,
including the input from the NATO Military
Committee and both Allied Command Transformation
(ACT) and Allied Command Operations (ACO). The
revised Political Guidance followed in the wake of the
alliance’s momentous Wales Summit in September
2014. Although the Wales meeting was originally
conceived as a victory lap following the winding down
of major allied combat operations in Afghanistan,
the summit agenda was upended by two key events
earlier that year: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s declaration of
an Islamic caliphate in Syria and Iraq. These twin
security challenges prompted a significant reappraisal
of NATO’s ends, ways, and means. The drafting and
approval of the 2015 Political Guidance was one of the
first expressions of this reassessment.
The issuance of the 2015 Political Guidance
fulfilled the nearly yearlong effort to complete step 1
of the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP).25
The 2015 Political Guidance—significantly lengthier
than previous versions—devoted considerably more
attention to deterrence and collective defense, topics
that had faded in relative importance since the end
of the Cold War, when NATO began to embrace outof-area expeditionary operations in places like Bosnia
and Afghanistan. The revised Political Guidance also
represented a reopening of the internal NATO debate
between collective defense—traditionally the focus of
25. NATO, “Statement by NATO Defence Ministers,” Press
Release (2015) 094, June 25, 2015, https://www.nato.int/cps/en
/natohq/news_121133.htm.
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allies worried about Russia—and crisis management—
more often the focus of allies along NATO’s southern
tier.26 As NATO moved to reembrace collective
defense with a renewed focus on Russia, the new
Political Guidance did not call for an abandonment or
a scaling back of crisis management missions. Instead,
the alliance would maintain a 360-degree approach to
security—in other words, NATO would attempt to be
all things to all allies.27 Avoiding hard choices early in
the planning process would have serious implications
in later stages of the NDPP. In short, allies would
soon see a full-spectrum alliance requires a significant
expansion of military requirements.
Through the fall of 2015 and the winter months
that followed, ACT, in coordination with ACO and
defense planners on the NATO International Staff
and the International Military Staff, developed
the Minimum Capability Requirement (MCR). As
noted earlier, the MCR maps the broad guidance
outlined in the Political Guidance to specific military
capabilities and forces. Convincing the allies the
minimum capabilities necessary to fulfill NATO’s
Level of Ambition would have to expand was no
easy feat. Largely left to key leaders in ACT, this task
required explaining to the allies the reason the MCR
was expanding from its previous iteration.28 Allied
Command Transformation (ACT) based its arguments
26. Aylin Matlé and Alessandro Scheffler Corvaja, From
Wales to Warsaw: A New Normal for NATO?, Facts & Findings no.
187 (Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, e.V., October 2015).
27. John R. Deni, “Staying Alive by Overeating? The
Enduring NATO Alliance at 70,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies
17, issue 2 (June 2019): 157–73.
28. Senior defense planner on the NATO International Staff,
interview by the author, October 25, 2017.
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on the dramatically changed security environment
confronting the alliance. Given this argument, any
objective observer would have found arguing against
the expansion of the MCR difficult. Even though the
allies do not approve the MCR, it is a foundational
document for the development of the capability
targets; thus, the allies’ ultimate acknowledgment of
the necessity of an expanded MCR in March 2016 was
an important event.
This acknowledgment and acceptance of ACT
and ACO’s justification was critical—without it, the
international secretariat would have found convincing
the allies to accept increased targets in their capability
packages later on much more difficult. Ultimately, the
allies acknowledged the expanded MCR for several
reasons. First, of course, were the persuasive arguments
regarding the changed threat environment.29 But ACT
benefited from having conducted an in-depth analysis
in 2015 of the previous NDPP to identify lessons
learned.30 This identification of lessons learned gave
ACT, ACO, and the International Staff awareness of
the likely key points of friction with the allies as the
2014–18 NDPP unfolded. The identification of lessons
learned also created a body of knowledge on the
requirements for the international secretariat to move
forward and ensure the MCR would be perceived by
allies as thorough and valid.

29. Petr Pavel, Curtis M. Scaparrotti, and Denis Mercier,
“Joint Press Conference” (speech, NATO Headquarters, Brussels,
Belgium, May 18, 2016), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq
/opinions_131048.htm.
30. Retired senior military officer formerly assigned to
Allied Command Transformation (ACT), interview by the author,
May 21, 2020.
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A key reason the 2016 MCR was viewed as more
relevant than it had been in the past was by the 2014–
18 iteration of the NDPP, ACT and ACO were using
more rigorous analytical techniques to translate the
Political Guidance into the MCR. These improved
techniques convinced the allies the expanded MCR, as
developed by ACT, ACO, the International Staff, and
the International Military Staff, was a vital and valid
representation of the capabilities NATO needed.31
Finally, another important reason the allies
approved the MCR was the degree of transparency
involved in its development, which had improved
over previous NDPP iterations.32 Throughout 2015
and 2016, the international secretariat regularly
briefed allied delegations in Brussels. Typically, these
meetings occurred with individual delegations, but
they were also conducted in small group or regional
contexts as well as with all allies at once. Some
meetings were held over breakfast, and others over
lunch, but all had the objective of providing allies with
maximum accessibility to the most senior ranks of the
international secretariat to address allies’ concerns,
maintain rumor control, and achieve buy-in on the
MCR as it was being built.
Completion of the MCR meant the NDPP could
shift to step 3, the apportionment of capability targets.
The Multilateral Examinations that form a critical

31. Defense investment experts on the NATO International
Staff, interview by the author, October 26, 2017.
32. Civilian official assigned to the Danish delegation
to NATO, interview by the author, October 25, 2017; military
official assigned to the German delegation to NATO, interview
by the author, October 26, 2017; and retired senior military officer
formerly assigned to ACT.
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part of step 3 were slated to start in spring 2017, and
Portugal was the first country up for discussion.33
Weeks before, in the spring, Lisbon had indicated
it would not accept the capability targets it had been
allocated. To avoid being saddled with the targets it
wanted to reject, the Portuguese delegation at NATO
Headquarters in Brussels had lined up several other
allies to voice objections during Portugal’s Multilateral
Examination. These objections would thwart
consensus among the other allies, thereby preventing
Portugal from having to agree to its apportioned
capability targets.
As Portugal’s Multilateral Examination unfolded,
the Portuguese delegation indicated it was under
strict guidance from Lisbon to give no ground. As
the meeting broke for lunch, representatives of the
US delegation to NATO approached the International
Staff members who were chairing the examination.
The Americans suggested canceling the rest of the
meeting because they were concerned when the
decision arose later that day on whether to apportion
capability targets to Portugal despite its objections, at
least one other member of the alliance would break
consensus. From the US perspective, such an event
would set a terrible precedent at a critical time for the
alliance, opening the door for other allies to fend off
capability target allocations successfully during their
respective Multilateral Examinations.
Instead of canceling the afternoon session, some
key members of the International Staff approached
the Portuguese delegation during the lunch break.
These members spoke at length, and, in the name of
33. Attendees at Portugal’s Multilateral Examination,
interview by the author, October 2017.
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allied solidarity, the International Staff implored the
Portuguese to not request other national delegations to
support Portugal’s rejection of targets. Eventually, the
Portuguese delegation relented, agreeing in the end
not to seek support from other allies to break consensus
over Portugal’s apportioned capability targets.
This procedure became the model other allies
followed over the next several months—that is,
all allies agreed not to seek support in breaking
consensus on their apportioned capability targets.
The International Staff, and the alliance more broadly,
had averted an unhelpful outcome at a time when the
security environment had changed dramatically in
Europe; when allies were looking for signs of solidarity
and reassurance, especially Eastern European allies;
and when the alliance genuinely needed to expand
its military capability and capacity. All Multilateral
Examinations ended by summer 2017, and not a single
capability target was left on the table unapportioned.
Following the Multilateral Examinations, NATO
entities worked to assist allies in implementation,
including through multinational projects and
commonly funded projects. Next, the international
secretariat began step 5: reviewing the results.
This step was accomplished by examining baseline
capability surveys from each of the allies. These
surveys were originally due by the end of July 2017,
but numerous allies missed this deadline as they
continued to gather information.
As the baseline capability surveys were completed,
the International Staff began another series of
consultations with each ally to achieve a fuller
understanding of each ally’s implementation efforts.
This work continued through mid-2018. Obviously,
some capability targets required long lead times for
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development, acquisition, and fielding, but in some
cases the International Staff found serious progress
toward achieving the allocated capability targets. The
International Staff found several examples of goodfaith pursuit of high-profile, expensive capabilities
that allies had only reluctantly accepted originally.
Most notably, in some limited cases, the International
Staff also found evidence of allies pursuing capability
targets they had originally contested before the
Multinational Examinations.34
Nonetheless, in some cases allies appeared to
be hedging on capability target implementation in
a variety of ways. For example, some allies simply
pushed out the time line for the delivery of allocated
capabilities. A heavy infantry brigade was a common
target allocated to a number of larger or mediumsized allies, and the International Staff assessed some
Southern European allies were slow to put plans in
place to deliver this capability, in part because the
capability did not appear to mesh well with national
defense agendas.35 In one case, an ally said it could
achieve initial operating capability of this target with
24 months’ notice, which essentially amounted to a
rolling, indefinite delay.
Nevertheless, the 2014–18 NDPP was, overall, a
major success in the alliance’s effort to reembrace the
commitment to mutual defense as defined in Article
5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. For the first time in
a quarter century, alliance capability targets were
apportioned without objection, and NATO made
34. Defense planner on the NATO International Staff,
interview by the author, February 5, 2018.
35. Representative of the US delegation to NATO, interview
by the author, November 26, 2019.
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tangible, unmistakable progress toward strengthening
deterrence and reassurance.
EXPLAINING THE 2014–18 NDPP
Why did the Portuguese delegation effectively
agree to its apportioned capability targets during its
Multilateral Examination? Why did every other ally
follow suit? Why did the 2014–18 iteration of the
NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) result in
such a different set of outcomes relative to previous
NDPP iterations? The available evidence, including
interviews with direct participants, discussions with
observers of the process, and official statements and
policy documents, indicates no single factor caused
allies to accept their capability targets. Rather, a
variety of factors appear to have been important.
First, nearly every individual interviewed for this
monograph cited the changed threat environment.
The new threat environment comprised several
events and threats, but, in particular, the role played
by Russia cannot be overstated.36 Russia’s invasion
36. Senior civilian on the NATO International Staff,
interview by the author, March 4, 2016; defense planners on the
NATO International Staff, interview by the author, March 4,
2016; senior defense planner on the NATO International Staff; US
military officers assigned to the US Mission to NATO, interview
by the author, October 24, 2017; civilian official assigned to
the Dutch delegation to NATO; civilian official assigned to the
Danish delegation to NATO; Defense planner on the NATO
International Staff, interview by the author, October 25, 2017;
military official assigned to the German delegation to NATO;
defense investment experts on the NATO International Staff;
military official assigned to the Italian delegation to NATO,
interview by the author, October 26, 2017; and military official
assigned to the Romanian delegation to NATO, interview by the
author, October 26, 2017.
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and de facto occupation of the Donbas, Moscow’s
illegal annexation of Crimea, and Russia’s unremitting
efforts to destabilize countries across the continent
politically and intimidate them have together formed
the most important event in regional security since
the unification of Germany. From the end of the Cold
War until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO had
slowly but steadily lost the ability to conduct largescale maneuver warfare, a capability necessary, if
not sufficient, to defend against a Russian attack.
Alliance manpower, doctrine, strategy, training, and
equipment had shifted toward smaller, lighter, and
expeditionary operations, such as those in Kosovo
and Afghanistan.
In the halls of NATO Headquarters and in allied
capitals, allies recognized reconfiguring the alliance
toward deterrence and defense against Russia
required a major reinvestment in conventional
maneuver warfare capabilities.37 Official alliance
pronouncements in 2014, 2015, and 2016 made this
shift in attitude clear as well. At the 2014 Wales
Summit, the alliance stated it would “reverse the
trend of declining defence budgets,” and “increased
investments should be directed towards meeting . . .
capability priorities.”38 At Wales, the allies agreed to
a Defence Investment Pledge and a Readiness Action
Plan, including priorities such as “improving the
robustness and readiness of our land forces for both
collective defence and crisis response.”39
37.

Mattelaer, “Revisiting the Principles.”

38. NATO, “Wales Summit Declaration,” Press Release no.
(2014) 120, September 5, 2014, https://www.nato.int/cps/en
/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.
39.

NATO, “Wales Summit Declaration.”
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Several months later, at the June 2015 defense
ministers’ meeting, allied defense ministers reiterated
the changed threat environment required the
“transformation of our forces and capabilities and
the way we employ them.”40 The defense ministers
also reaffirmed their commitment to “reversing the
trend of declining funding for defence” because
of the changed threat environment and Russia’s
destabilizing activities across Europe.41 At the October
2015 defense ministers’ meeting, NATO Secretary
General Jens Stoltenberg noted through efforts
initiated since the 2014 Wales Summit, the alliance
had made “the biggest reinforcement to . . . collective
defence since the end of the cold war,” which would
result in “a deterrence which is so essential to make
sure that all NATO countries are safe and that they
can rely on NATO.”42
In 2016, the allies agreed at the Warsaw Summit to
endorse a new deterrence and defense posture, which
included stationing trip-wire forces in the newer allied
countries of Eastern Europe on a continuous basis—a
post-Cold War first. The allies also agreed to provide
“heavier and more high-end forces and capabilities,
as well as more forces at higher readiness.”43
Clearly, a concern was growing within NATO
and in allied capitals that Russia had dramatically
altered the security environment in Europe, and the

40.

NATO, “Statement by NATO Defence Ministers.”

41.

NATO, “Statement by NATO Defence Ministers.”

42. Jens Stoltenberg, “Press Conference” (speech, NATO
Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, October 8, 2015).
43. North Atlantic Council, Warsaw Summit Communiqué
(Warsaw: North Atlantic Council, July 9, 2016).
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alliance needed to respond by increasing readiness,
capabilities, and capacity.
Second, the officials interviewed for this
monograph broadly agreed, even if they did so
grudgingly, the American obsession with the 2-percent
goal and burden sharing in general played an
important role in the allies accepting their capability
targets.44 The focus on the 2-percent goal is typically
attributed to Trump, but the defense spending target
has been in the forefront of NATO leader discussions
since the 2014 Wales Summit and President Barack
Obama’s second term, and arguably well before then.45
Clearly, presidential and prime ministerial attention,
focus, and rhetoric have a way of driving decision
making at all other echelons of government. When
the heads of state and government agree on spending
targets, defense ministers gain influence and power in
interagency and interministerial debates, particularly
relative to finance ministers, who often wield decisive
authority over doling out fiscal largesse. As Obama
did before him, Trump—who has arguably more
profoundly instrumentalized the threat of American
abandonment than any of his predecessors—has used
44. Civilian official assigned to the United Kingdom
delegation to NATO, interview by the author, March 3, 2016; US
military officer assigned to the US Mission to NATO, interview
by the author, August 11, 2016; US military officers assigned to
the US Mission to NATO; civilian official assigned to the Dutch
delegation to NATO; civilian official assigned to the Danish
delegation to NATO; civilian defense planner on the NATO
International Staff, interview by the author, October 25, 2017; and
military official assigned to the Romanian delegation to NATO.
45. Christina Wilkie, “Trump Is Pushing NATO Allies to
Spend More on Defense. But So Did Obama and Bush,” CNBC,
July 11, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/11/obama-and
-bush-also-pressed-nato-allies-to-spend-more-on-defense.html.
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his authority to ensure burden sharing and defense
spending have remained at or near the top of every
NATO summit agenda since 2014, coercing and
cajoling his counterparts to do more.46
For instance, in the immediate aftermath of
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Obama called for more
equitable burden sharing in NATO’s response: “One
of the things that I think, medium and long term, we’ll
have to examine is whether everybody is chipping
in.”47 Later, during the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO’s
leaders reiterated their commitment to the 2-percent
defense spending goal and related defense investment
goals, especially the Defence Investment Pledge.
Obama spoke of the pledge during his remarks to
the press following the Wales meeting, and he would
continue to raise the issue during the remaining years
of his presidency.48
46. For example, see Julian E. Barnes and Helene Cooper,
“Trump Discussed Pulling US from NATO, Aides Say amid New
Concerns over Russia,” New York Times, January 14, 2019, https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-president
-trump.html; and John Bolton, The Room Where It Happened (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 2020), 143–46.
47. Barack Obama, “EU-US Summit Address” (speech,
EU-US Summit, Brussels, Belgium, March 26, 2014), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/world/transcript-obama-addresses-nato
-strength-at-march-26-news-conference-in-brussels/2014/03/26
/ade45c16-b4f2-11e3-b899-20667de76985_story.html.
48. Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama at
NATO Summit Press Conference” (speech, 2014 Wales Summit,
Newport, Wales, September 5, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse
.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/05/remarks-president
-obama-nato-summit-press-conference; and Nolan D. McCaskill,
“Obama Urges NATO Members to Pull Their Weight,” Politico,
November 15, 2016, https://www.politico.com/story/2016/11
/obama-nato-pay-fair-share-231405.
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In April 2016, in remarks intended for average
European citizens, Obama argued “Europe has been
complacent about its own defense,” and he implored
Europeans to bear their fair share of the burden.49
Later that same year, at the Warsaw Summit, Obama
raised the issue again with his European counterparts,
noting to the press afterwards: “The majority of
allies are still not hitting that 2 percent mark—an
obligation we agreed to in Wales. So we had a very
candid conversation about this. There’s a recognition
that given the range of threats that we face and the
capabilities that we need, everybody has got to step
up and everybody has got to do better.”50
Trump has made the 2-percent spending goal the
signature issue of his interactions with European allies
on security matters. As a candidate, Trump appeared
to tie the 2-percent spending commitment to whether
the United States should defend particular allies,
implying Washington should reconsider coming to the

49. Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama in
Address to the People of Europe” (speech, Hannove Messe
Fairgrounds, Hannover, Germany, April 25, 2016), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/25
/remarks-president-obama-address-people-europe.
50. Ayesha Rascoe and Yeganeh Torbati, “Burden Sharing
Woes to Cloud Obama’s Trip to NATO Summit,” Reuters, July 6,
2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summit-obama
-idUSKCN0ZM2KX; and Barack Obama, “Press Conference
by President Obama after NATO Summit” (speech, 2016
Warsaw Summit, Warsaw, Poland, July 9, 2016), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/09
/press-conference-president-obama-after-nato-summit.
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aid of any ally that does not meet its commitments.51
Since his earliest days in office, Trump has returned to
this theme whenever discussing the subject of allies.52
Eventually, Trump would even claim credit for the
turnaround in alliance defense spending, even though
the turnaround had begun before his election.53 At
a minimum, Trump can at least be given credit for
aggressively keeping burden sharing on NATO’s front
burner, following in the footsteps of and building
upon the work of his predecessors.
At the working level, during the 2014–18 NDPP,
the American delegation to NATO amplified the
rhetoric emanating from the top of the Executive
Branch. In particular, the US delegation indicated
it would not pick up any targets other allies had
rejected. In other words, Washington would not place
itself in the position of guaranteeing no targets would
be left unapportioned.

51. Donald Trump, “Foreign Policy Speech” (speech,
Center for the National Interest, Washington, DC, April 27, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/us/politics/transcript
-trump-foreign-policy.html; and Donald Trump, “Speech at the
Republican National Convention” (speech, Republican National
Convention, Cleveland, Ohio, July 20, 2016), https://www
.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/us/politics/donald-trump-foreign
-policy-interview.html.
52. Donald Trump, “Trump’s Address to Joint Session of
Congress” (speech, the Capitol, Washington, DC, February 28,
2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/02/28/516717981/watch-live
-trump-addresses-joint-session-of-congress.
53. C. K. Hickey, “NATO Defense Funds Have Been
Building for Years, but Trump Wants the Credit,” Foreign Policy,
December 3, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/03/nato
-defense-funds-have-been-building-for-years-but-trump-wants
-the-credit/.
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Finally, in addition to renewed threats to European
security and pressure from Washington for more
equitable burden sharing, a third factor seems to have
been critical in the 2014–18 NDPP: the role played by
the NATO international secretariat.54 In spring 2015,
NATO hired a new director for defense planning, and
just months later, ACT named a new head of capability
development. These key staff moves came on the
heels of the appointment a year-and-a-half before of
a new assistant secretary general for defence policy
and planning: Heinrich Brauss, a retired German
general officer.
Together, these new staff members and their staffs
instituted several key changes to the NDPP. First, the
staff members built a more rigorous and transparent
burden-sharing analysis capability known as the
Burden Equivalency Model.55 This model was vital
to ensuring eventual acceptance by the allies of the
allocated capability targets. The more rigorous burdensharing analysis—and the transparency surrounding
it—allowed allies to understand how ACT, ACO, and
the International Staff arrived at their conclusions
about the burdens countries were carrying.
Rigor, transparency, and iterative consultations
proved to be an invaluable part of the NDPP. To be
clear, allies still tried to push back on the findings
of the international secretariat and shift burdens to
other allies during step 3, but the depth and scope
54. Civilian official assigned to the Dutch delegation to
NATO; senior defense planner on the NATO International Staff;
military official assigned to the German delegation to NATO;
defense investment experts on the NATO International Staff;
military official assigned to the Italian delegation to NATO; and
retired senior military officer formerly assigned to ACT.
55.

Senior defense planner on the NATO International Staff.
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of information available for defending particular
assessments and target allocations typically helped to
carry the day.
The high-quality information led to more
robust Multilateral Examinations, including the
pivotal Portuguese examination in February 2017.
Additionally, the international secretariat evinced
a high degree of diplomatic creativity in finding a
solution that permitted the Portuguese to remain true
to guidance from Lisbon while nonetheless ensuring
no capability targets would be left unapportioned.
Additionally, the international secretariat proposed
a redefinition of the time lines available to the allies to
fulfill their capability commitments. The “short term”
was lengthened from five years to six years, and the
“midterm” from 15 years to 19 years in duration.56
The lengthening of time lines made agreeing on the
acquisition of specific capabilities in the midterm
easier for allies because they had more time to do so.57
The willingness of policy entrepreneurs in the NATO
international secretariat to pursue their remit to its
utmost in these ways was therefore critical at several
points to the success of the 2014–18 NDPP.
What do these key conclusions drawn from the
2014–18 NDPP tell us about the relative strength of
the hypotheses outlined earlier? Clearly regime type
(hypothesis 1)—in which presidential systems or
single-party parliamentary systems were expected
to accept capability targets more willingly—
did not matter in the 2014–18 NDPP. Portugal, a
parliamentary democracy, held elections in November
56.

Defense planner on the NATO International Staff.

57. Military official assigned to the Italian delegation to
NATO; and military official assigned to the Romanian delegation
to NATO.
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2015, resulting in a minority government led by the
center-left Socialist Party. This minority government
was in place in February 2017 during Portugal’s
Multilateral Examination, when the country agreed
not to seek support for the rejection of its apportioned
capability targets. Moreover, all NATO allies—a
variety of presidential and parliamentary systems—
followed suit.
Hypothesis 2 (public opinion) appears to have
played a minimal role in explaining the 2014–18 NDPP
outcomes. Certainly, European populaces had become
somewhat more willing to spend money on defense—
which would facilitate greater burden sharing—
but only in a relative sense. Polling data from 2016
shows only in a small number of countries—such as
Poland and the Netherlands—did the public favor
increasing defense spending.58 Most countries favored
maintaining defense spending at existing levels, which
in 2016 nonetheless represented an increase from
previous years.
Even less evidence supports hypothesis 3 (domestic
political economy) having carried any significant
weight in explaining the outcomes of the 2014–18
NDPP. By 2016, European economies were emerging—
albeit slowly—from the depths of the Great Recession
of 2007–9. Average year-on-year growth rates in gross
domestic product in the EU reached 2 percent in 2015

58. Bruce Stokes, Richard Wike, and Jacob Poushter,
Europeans Face the World Divided (Washington, DC: Pew Research
Center, June 13, 2016).
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and even moved slightly higher in 2016.59 Although
some European economies were showing stronger
growth rates than others, domestic political economic
factors do not appear to have been a strong motivator
in decision making vis-à-vis the NDPP.
Similarly, little evidence indicates an especially
robust collective action problem (hypothesis 5) was
at play in the 2014–18 NDPP, driving smaller allies
to engage in free riding and to push burdens toward
larger allies. In fact, the allies that attempted to shift
burdens were the larger ones, and they attempted
to push burdens onto both large and small allies.60
But when presented with the rigorous analysis and
background data amassed by the NATO international
secretariat, allies typically dropped this tactic.
Having ruled out these hypotheses, a collection
of other hypotheses—external security threat
(hypothesis 4), American coercion (hypothesis 7), and
the international secretariat’s influence (hypothesis
8)—is the strongest explanation. The clear evidence
of a dramatically changed security environment in
Europe; the consistent American emphasis on fairer
burden sharing; and the rigor, transparency, and
creativity of the international secretariat in shaping
and implementing the NDPP together best explain
the success NATO achieved in the 2014–18 NDPP.
59. Silvia Amaro, “Euro Zone Growth Outpaces the US for
the First Time since the 2008 Crash,” CNBC, January 31, 2017,
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/31/euro-zone-gdp-hits-05-in
-last-quarter-of-2016-beating-estimates-january-inflation-at-18
-unemployment-falls.html; and “Stable GDP Growth Continues
in the EU and United States,” UN Economic Commission for
Europe, 2017, https://www.unece.org/info/media/news
/statistics/2017/stable-gdp-growth-continues-in-the-eu-and
-united-states/doc.html.
60.

Retired senior military officer formerly assigned to ACT.
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Additionally, shared norms (hypothesis 6) played a
minor role: The international secretariat employed
arguments based in part on solidarity and shared
burdens that helped convince the Portuguese not to
seek support for the rejection of their apportioned
capability targets. But in terms of explanatory power,
this hypothesis does not appear to be on the same level
as the other three.
CONCLUSION: BUILDING UPON SUCCESS
The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) is a
major bureaucratic undertaking for both the alliance
organization and the allies. For a very small handful
of larger allies, like the United States, national interest
and other objectives drive defense requirements and
force development to the degree NATO requirements
are more of an afterthought. For many more allies,
though, the NDPP represents their primary defense
planning tool. For an alliance based on consensus
and fair burden and risk sharing, the NDPP is a vital
process. The 2014–18 NDPP placed the alliance on a
footing to achieve significantly more equitable sharing
of common defense burdens among the NATO allies.
How can NATO and its leading ally, the United
States, build on this success and replicate it in future
NDPP iterations? This section of the monograph will
attempt to glean key lessons and offer some policy
recommendations, addressing first the components
that should remain unchanged in future NDPP
iterations and then the components that should
perhaps change.
Among the aspects that should remain unchanged,
the foremost aspect is analytical rigor and transparency
throughout the NDPP on the part of the international
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secretariat. The quantitative and qualitative analysis
tools like the Burden Equivalency Model built by ACT
and then used by ACT, ACO, and the International
Staff, though not perfect, were critical to bolstering the
validity of the MCR document and the apportioned
capability targets that flowed from it. These tools
made pushing back against the central assumptions
and findings and results of the NDPP more difficult
for allies.
Concomitant with the right tools was the
international secretariat’s willingness to show allies
how those tools were built and used. Transparency
was vital to keeping all stakeholders engaged and
feeling they were part of the broader process and
team effort. Iterative consultations over time with
the stakeholders increased the credibility of the
international secretariat and its analysis. Transparency
and a willingness to engage repeatedly in various
formats—one on one, multilateral, regional, and so
forth—helped to convince the allies the results of the
NDPP were valid.
Finally, policy makers in Washington and at
NATO Headquarters in Brussels should bear in mind
the importance of individual leaders and personalities
in key NATO international secretariat billets. The
expertise, motivation, creativity, and initiative of the
key players within the NATO international secretariat
were essential to the success of the 2014–18 NDPP.
Though civilian officials might occupy a billet for
many years, keeping most military personnel in the
same posts for more than a handful of years is not
feasible. In the military establishments of larger allies,
military personnel rotate from one job to another every
couple of years. Nonetheless, when new civilian and
military personnel are assigned to particular billets
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at NATO, the most senior levels of the international
secretariat—as well as the alliance’s leading official—
ought to assess through face-to-face meetings,
references, and other means whether designees have
the right mix of skills and characteristics necessary for
organizational success. The processes and authorities
for accomplishing this assessment do not necessarily
exist today, but allies ought to consider addressing
this important issue of personnel management.
As for the changes that should occur for future
NDPP iterations, the most obvious problem is the
NDPP lacks an enforcement mechanism. According to
one observer, if allies can survive two hours of rough
questioning every two to four years, then skating
through without taking on additional requirements is
possible.61 Similarly, some allies’ practice of accepting
an apportioned target without fully acknowledging
they will fill it, though certainly a creative diplomatic
method of not leaving capability targets on the table,
creates problems of its own. For instance, during step
5 of the NDPP, when allies are asked to show progress
they have made toward their targets, an ally may have
no funded plan to develop a capability the ally has
ostensibly committed to delivering, and the alliance
cannot force a remedy.
Fixing this problem is difficult, primarily because
the alliance comprises sovereign states, and it has little
in the way of penalty mechanisms. Certainly, coercion
through naming and shaming is one of these tools,
but, as suggested above, it is a limited one. Although
the alliance may lack much in the way of “sticks,” it
does have “carrots” in the form of benefits that are
61. US military officer assigned to the US Mission to NATO,
interview by the author, March 4, 2016.
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unrelated to security and that allies value, and many
of these carrots are tied to prestige. For example, allies
covet billets for their military officers, facilities paid
for in part by NATO, command structure elements,
the honor of hosting summits, and invitations to
participate in major events and activities. Some of
these benefits, such as facilities, cannot easily be
taken away from allies who are shirking their burdensharing responsibilities. But tying these carrots to
performance on capability development or other
measures of burden sharing might spur greater
commitment and yield more impressive results. In an
alliance of sovereign states operating by consensus,
no easy path for putting such tools in place exists.
Nonetheless, with effort and leadership and under
the right circumstances, the alliance has shown the
ability to achieve dramatic and sometimes previously
unthinkable results; both the 2014 Wales Summit and
2016 Warsaw Summit demonstrate this ability.
Additionally, Washington can apply pressure as
a means of encouraging burden sharing, although a
telephone is perhaps a more useful instrument than
a megaphone in this instance for two reasons. First,
the former method of communication allows for
more discrete messaging. Not all European audiences
respond in the same way to loud, public American
coercion. Allies that are more Atlanticist or that like
to perceive themselves as good allies may be more
willing to heed Washington’s concerns, even if
delivered loudly and publicly. For these countries,
presidential pressure has an impact. Elsewhere,
though, boisterous American coercion comes across
as bullying, gets exploited by domestic political
opponents, and makes spending more on defense and
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taking up more of the shared burden more difficult to
advocate for policy makers.
Second, a telephone implies two-way dialogue,
and a megaphone does not. In other words, allies will
be more willing to heed American concerns when the
allies think Washington will, in turn, provide them a
greater voice in other contexts or a reward in a domain
not necessarily related to NATO or defense. In a
sense, some reward for being a good ally and sharing
burdens must be offered beyond the obvious security
benefits. Most allies want to be perceived domestically
and internationally as having influence in Washington.
In addition to adding teeth to the NDPP, NATO
ought to consider developing an NDPP training course
on the international secretariat. This monograph
found the international secretariat played a vital role
in facilitating the unprecedented success of the 2014–
18 NDPP. Given the importance of the international
secretariat, ensuring the many lessons learned from
the 2014–18 iteration will be propagated throughout
the staff and over time will be vital, especially among
military staff members being introduced to the process
for the first time. At present, only a broad, fourday defense planning course (N5-36) offered at the
NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, is open
to both NATO international secretariat personnel and
personnel from national military establishments. The
alliance ought to craft a course for the international
secretariat that examines in depth the modalities and
mechanisms involved in the NDPP.
In addition to lacking an appropriate NDPP
training course for NATO international secretariat
personnel, the NDPP lacks a common lexicon or
taxonomy used from one NDPP iteration to the next
as well as consistently by NATO to describe capability
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priorities. For instance, the meaning of “capability
shortfall” has shifted, and the definition of “the
usability of land maneuver formations” is not used
consistently by the alliance. Common understanding
among the many international secretariat personnel
and allied defense establishments on both sides
of the Atlantic is vitally important, and the lack of
an enduring, more consistently applied taxonomy
hinders such understanding. Obviously, technological
advances will necessitate updates in terminology, but
a more standardized, consistently used taxonomy
for capabilities and end states that can endure across
NDPP iterations and be employed across alliance
functions could make establishing common knowledge
easier for allies and international secretariat personnel.
Finally, the secretariat should continue to ensure
the NDPP is regularly modernized to address
emerging security challenges and scenarios. For
example, although the NDPP has long addressed
cyber issues, it does not yet specifically address
information operations during peacetime. Such
operations by Russia, China, and others pose a
challenge to the alliance under the threshold of Article
5 and are arguably more likely to occur than a major
conventional attack launched by Moscow against
the West. Certainly, NATO and the allies’ defense
establishments must plan and prepare for worst-case
scenarios, but addressing emerging, arguably more
likely challenges and the capabilities necessary for
meeting them would help to improve the relevance
of the NDPP.
The NDPP is a critical tool for the alliance. The
process enables NATO to shape the capabilities of
the allies and, in doing so, fundamentally facilitates
the ability of all allies to fulfill their obligations
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to each other as embodied in the Article 5 mutual
self-defense clause of the North Atlantic Treaty.
The 2017 success of the NDPP may have marked a
turning point in the seemingly endless transatlantic
debate over burden sharing. But the allies will
need to redouble efforts to ensure they build upon
the success of 2017 in future NDPP iterations,
particularly as the recession induced by the
coronavirus pandemic places downward pressure
on defense spending across the alliance over the
next several years.
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